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Abstract
In this note, we present a novel computerized real eort task based on moving sliders
across a screen which overcomes many of the drawbacks of existing real eort tasks. The task
was rst developed and used by us in Gill and Prowse (American Economic Review, 2012).
We outline the design of our \slider task", describe its advantages compared to existing real
eort tasks and provide a statistical analysis of the behavior of subjects undertaking the
task. We believe that the task will prove valuable to researchers in designing future real
eort experiments, and to this end we provide z-Tree code and guidance to assist researchers
wishing to implement the slider task.
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1 Introduction
Many experimental designs feature a costly activity. For example, subjects choose how much
eort to exert when competing in a tournament (Bull et al., 1987), when producing output as
part of a team (van Dijk et al., 2001), when responding to the wages set by an employer (Fehr
et al., 1997) and when earning endowments which then form the starting point for a bargaining
game (Burrows and Loomes, 1994).
There are two ways of implementing costly activities in a laboratory experiment: via a
monetary cost function which mimics eort by specifying output as a function of how much
money the subject contributes (Bull et al., 1987); and using a real eort task. The monetary
cost function allows the experimenter full control over the cost of eort. In particular, the
experimenter can control the extent of any convexity in the cost of the activity and can also
determine how the cost varies over individuals and over any repetitions of the game. Increasingly,
laboratory experiments have featured real eort tasks, such as (i) solving mazes (Gneezy et al.,
2003), mathematical problems (Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003) or word games (Burrows
and Loomes, 1994); (ii) answering general knowledge questions (Homan et al., 1994); (iii)
counting (Abeler et al., 2009), decoding (Chow, 1983) or entering (Dickinson, 1999) strings
of characters; (iv) performing numerical optimization (van Dijk et al., 2001); and (v) lling
envelopes (Konow, 2000), cracking walnuts (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000) or other physical tasks.
The main advantage of using a real eort task over a monetary cost function is the greater
external validity of the experiment, which increases with how closely exerting eort in the task
replicates the exertion of eort outside of the laboratory.
In this note we present a novel and simple computerized real eort task which overcomes
many of the drawbacks of existing real eort tasks. Our task, rst developed and used by us in
Gill and Prowse (2012), consists of a single screen containing a number \sliders" which subjects
move to a specied position within an allotted time. We call this the \slider task". The slider task
has since been used by us in Gill and Prowse (2010) and Gill et al. (2012), and by others in Hetzel
(2010), Bonein and Denant-Boemont (2011), Cettolin and Riedl (2011), Eacret et al. (2011),
Hammermann et al. (2011), Abeler and Jager (2012), Djawadi and Fahr (2012), Doerrenberg
and Duncan (2012a), Doerrenberg and Duncan (2012b), Dolan et al. (2012), Evdokimov and
Rahman (2012), Fahr and Djawadi (2012), Fonseca and Myles (2012), Kimbrough and Reiss
(2012), Monahan (2012), Riener and Wiederhold (2012), Brown et al. (2013), Das et al. (2013)
and Riener and Wiederhold (2013).
Section 2 outlines the design of the task. Section 3 details the advantages of our slider task
compared to existing real eort tasks. Section 4 provides a statistical analysis of the behavior
of subjects undertaking our task. Section 5 contains a practical guide for researchers wishing
to implement the slider task. Section 6 concludes. z-Tree code accompanying this paper can be
used to create real eort laboratory experiments featuring the slider task.
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2 Design of the Slider Task
Our novel and simple real eort task consists of a single screen displaying a number of \sliders"
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). This screen does not vary across experimental
subjects or across repetitions of the task. A schematic representation of a single slider is shown
in Figure 1. When the screen containing the eort task is rst displayed to the subject all of
the sliders are positioned at 0, as shown for a single slider in Figure 1(a). By using the mouse,
the subject can position each slider at any integer location between 0 and 100 inclusive. Each
slider can be adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the current position
of each slider is displayed to the right of the slider. The subject's \points score" in the task,
interpreted as eort exerted, is the number of sliders positioned at 50 at the end of the allotted
time. Figure 1(b) shows a correctly positioned slider. As the task proceeds, the screen displays
the subject's current points score and the amount of time remaining.
(a) Initial position. (b) Positioned at 50.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a slider.
Figure 2 shows a screen containing 48 sliders, as shown to the subject in the laboratory in
Gill and Prowse (2012).
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Note: The screen presented here is slightly squarer than the one seen by our subjects.
Figure 2: Screen showing 48 sliders.
In this example, the subject has positioned four of the sliders at 50 and a points score of 4
is shown at the top of the screen. A fth slider is currently positioned at 42 and this slider does
not contribute to the subject's points score as it is not correctly positioned. To ensure that all
the sliders are equally dicult to position correctly, the 48 sliders are arranged on the screen
such that no two sliders are aligned exactly one under the other. This prevents the subject
being able to position the higher slider at 50 and then easily position the lower slider by copying
the position of the higher slider. The number of sliders and task length can be chosen by the
experimenter.
3 Advantages of the Slider Task
The slider task has a number of desirable attributes. First, the slider task is simple to commu-
nicate and to understand, and does not require or test pre-existing knowledge. Second, unlike
solving mathematical problems, counting characters, solving anagrams, negotiating mazes or
performing numerical optimization, the slider task is identical across repetitions. Third, the
task involves little randomness, so the number of correctly positioned sliders corresponds closely
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to the eort exerted by the subject. Fourth, there is no scope for guessing, which complicates
the design and interpretation of some existing tasks such as those based on counting characters
or numerical optimization.
These attributes are also shared by the envelope lling task, in which subjects stu real
envelopes with letters. Crucially, however, the slider task provides a nely gradated measure of
eort within a short time scale. In Section 4 we see that with 48 sliders and an allotted time of
120 seconds, measured eort varies from 0 to over 40. Thus substantial variation in behavior can
be observed, and by getting subjects to repeat the identical task many times the experimenter
can control for persistent unobserved heterogeneity using panel data methods. This allows robust
statistical inference. For example, the experimenter can use repeated observations of the same
subjects to estimate a distribution of eort costs, enabling structural estimation. The analysis
in Gill and Prowse (2012) illustrates the use of such methods.
Thus the task's design overcomes the principal drawback of using real eort up to now,
namely that \Since the experimenter does not know the workers' eort cost, it is not possible to
derive precise quantitative predictions" (Falk and Fehr, 2003, p. 404). Furthermore, because the
task is computerized, it is easy to implement and allows exible real-time subject interactions.
4 Statistical Analysis of Behavior in the Slider Task
We used the slider task in 6 laboratory sessions conducted at the Nueld Centre for Experi-
mental Social Sciences in Oxford. Throughout, the slider task included 48 sliders (as shown in
Figure 2) and the task length was 120 seconds. 20 subjects participated in each session.1 At
the beginning of every session half the subjects were told that they would be a \First Mover"
and the other half told they would be a \Second Mover" for the duration of the session. At
the beginning of each round, every First Mover was anonymously paired with a new Second
Mover using the no contagion algorithm of Cooper et al. (1996). A prize for each pair was
randomly chosen between $0.10 and $3.90 and revealed to the pair members. The First and
Second Movers then completed the slider task sequentially, with the Second Mover discovering
the points score of the First Mover she was paired with before starting the task. The prize was
then awarded to one pair member based on the relative points scores of the two pair members
and some element of chance.2 In total we have data on 60 First Movers and 60 Second Movers,
each observed during 10 rounds. For the purposes of analyzing behavior in the slider task, we
look only at the behavior of the First Movers.3
1All the sessions were conducted on weekdays at the same time of day. The subjects were students who did not
report Psychology or Economics as their main subject of study. The sliders were displayed on 22 inch widescreen
monitors with a 1680 by 1050 pixel resolution. To move the sliders, the subjects used 800 dpi USB mice with the
scroll wheel disabled. The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix C of Gill and Prowse (2009).
2The probability of winning the prize for each pair member was 50 plus her own points score minus the other
pair member's score, all divided by 100. In addition to any prizes accumulated during the experiment, all subjects
were paid a show-up fee of $4. The subjects also initially played 2 practice rounds against an automaton for
which they were not paid. We do not include the practice rounds in the data analysis.
3Gill and Prowse (2012) analyzes interactions between the eorts of the First and Second Movers.
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Table 1 summarizes the observed eorts of the First Movers in each of the 10 rounds.
Round Obs.
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Eort Eort Eort Eort
1 60 22:20
(6:07)
23 1 33
2 60 22:68
(6:66)
23.5 0 33
3 60 24:80
(6:03)
25.5 0 37
4 60 24:61
(5:90)
25 0 35
5 60 25:18
(6:94)
26 0 38
6 60 24:66
(7:45)
26 1 37
7 60 25:91
(5:81)
26 9 37
8 60 26:88
(5:82)
27 9 41
9 60 25:65
(8:48)
28 0 38
10 60 26:31
(6:72)
27 1 40
Table 1: Summary of First Movers' eorts by round.
We see that the mean points score tended to increase over the 10 rounds, from an average
of 22.2 sliders in the rst round to 26.3 sliders in the nal round. Given the average prize was
constant over rounds, this increase in eort is interpreted as a learning-by-doing eect. The
maximum observed eort was 41 and therefore it appears that no subject was able to position
correctly all 48 sliders in 120 seconds. We conclude that eorts were not constrained by the
upper limit imposed by the design of the task. There are 7 observations of 0s. Of these, 5
correspond to two subjects who appear to have had diculty positioning sliders at exactly 50
until a few rounds into the session. The remaining two observations of 0 correspond to a further
two subjects who chose to exert no eort towards the end of their session in response to low
prizes of $0.10 and $0.30.
Figure 3(a) shows the distribution of points scores. We see a substantial amount of variation
in behavior. Specically, a small cluster of subjects have zero or very low eorts, two-thirds of
eorts lie between 20 and 30 inclusive, while around 20% of eorts exceed 30. Thus, despite
subjects having only 120 seconds to complete the slider task, we see large dierences in observed
eorts. Figure 3(b) shows the results of a Lowess regression of the First Movers' eorts on the
prize. We see that eort is increasing in the prize, particularly at low prizes. This provides
evidence that subjects respond to nancial incentives when completing the slider task.
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Figure 3: Graphic analysis of First Movers' eorts.
Table 2 presents the results of a sequence of xed eects regressions of First Movers' eorts
on the prize and round number. In Model (1) the First Movers' eorts were regressed on a linear
time trend. Time eects are signicantly positive. In Model (2) a full set of time dummies is
included. The F statistic for the null hypothesis that the time trend is linear is 3.17 which
corresponds to a p value of 0.0048. Thus time eects are non-linear. However, we are unable to
reject linearity of the time eects starting from round 4: the F statistic for the null hypothesis
that the time trend is linear from round 4 onwards is 1.61 with a p value of 0.1595. In model (3)
the prize is included as an additional control. We see that the First Movers' eorts increase
signicantly in the prize, with a $1 increase in the prize causing an increase in eort of 0.7 of a
slider.4 In all the models, persistent unobserved individual eects account for about 75% of the
unobserved variation in performance.
To summarize the analysis, we observe a considerable degree of heterogeneity in behavior,
subjects respond positively to the value of the prize and eorts tend to increase over time.
4An additional regression, not reported, shows that there is no evidence of the square of the prize being a
signicant determinant of eort. Thus eort appears to be linear in the prize.
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(1) (2) (3)
Prize - - 0:671
(0:157)

Round number 0:434
(0:084)
 - -
- -
Round 2 - 0:483
(0:557)
0:404
(0:540)
Round 3 - 2:600
(0:545)
 2:498
(0:565)

Round 4 - 2:417
(0:562)
 2:286
(0:567)

Round 5 - 2:983
(0:694)
 2:823
(0:682)

Round 6 - 2:467
(0:797)
 2:481
(0:766)

Round 7 - 3:717
(0:540)
 3:694
(0:516)

Round 8 - 4:683
(0:686)
 4:676
(0:682)

Round 9 - 3:450
(1:079)
 3:482
(1:044)

Round 10 - 4:117
(0:754)
 4:355
(0:767)

Intercept 21:630
(0:627)
 22:200
(0:466)
 20:894
(0:508)

 5.494 5.494 5.491
 3.971 3.938 3.873
Observations 600 600 600
Subjects 60 60 60
Notes:  denotes the standard deviation of the time invariant individual specic xed eects
and  is the standard deviation of the time varying component of the individual level error
terms. Signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by ,  and .
Table 2: Fixed eects regressions for First Movers' eorts.
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5 A Practical Guide to Using the Slider Task
This Section provides a guide to researchers wishing to implement the slider task in the context
of their own laboratory experiments. Following some short comments pertaining to the preferred
citation and important disclaimers, we describe the accompanying code, which allows researchers
to implement easily the slider task in z-Tree. Finally, we list some practical considerations
associated with the use of the slider task.
Citation
The slider task was developed and rst used in an earlier paper of ours, Gill and Prowse (2012).5
Should you use this real eort task, or otherwise want to refer to the slider task, we kindly re-
quest that you include the following citation:
Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2012). `A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real
Eort Competition.' American Economic Review, 102, 469{503.
Furthermore, if you implement the slider task by using or modifying our z-Tree code, we
kindly request that you include the following statement in your paper:
\The code implementing the slider task is based on the code developed by Gill and Prowse
(2012)."
Disclaimer
The accompanying le, named GillProwseSliderExample.ztt, provides an implementation of the
real eort slider task used in Gill and Prowse (2012). The code we provide comes with no
warranty or guarantee. In providing this code we take no responsibility with regard to the use
or modications of the code.
Programs and Code
The code is available from the authors upon request, and can also be downloaded direct from
the website of Victoria Prowse.
The code provided takes the form of a .ztt le and should be run in z-Tree. The code
consists of a single le, named GillProwseSliderExample.ztt. This is a z-Tree treatment le.
The program implements the slider task for a single subject, with the number of rounds set
to one. This code can easily be embedded into an experimental design in which a real eort
task is required. Indeed, this is the exact real eort task used in the repeated sequential-move
5We also use the slider task in Gill and Prowse (2010) and Gill et al. (2012). The Introduction lists a number
of other studies that have used the slider task.
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tournament of Gill and Prowse (2012).6 The treatment GillProwseSliderExample.ztt consists of
three stages:
Stage 1 The subject is shown a screen informing her that the task is about to start. This
screen is displayed for 5 seconds and then the program automatically moves to stage 2.
Stage 2 The subject is shown a screen displaying 48 sliders. The round number and the re-
maining time are shown at the very top of the screen, and between this information and
the sliders there is a banner displaying the subject's current points score, i.e., the number
of sliders currently positioned at exactly 50. This screen is displayed for 120 seconds and
then the program automatically moves to stage 3.
Stage 3 The subject is shown a screen displaying her points score in the task. This screen is
displayed for 20 seconds and then the program automatically ends.
We now give some more detail about this treatment. Prior to the treatment commencing a
number of variables are created in the Background. First, the variable Effort is created. At
any point during the treatment this variable equals the number of sliders currently positioned
at exactly 50. Second, we create a set of 48 variables, denoted qx for x = 1; :::; 48. The variable
qx is the current position of the xth slider. Third, we create the variables sx for x = 1; :::; 48.
The variable sx takes the value one if the current position of the xth slider is equal to 50 and
zero otherwise. All variables are initialized to zero.
Each time the position of a slider is adjusted the values of qx and sx associated with the
particular slider in question are updated. The value of Effort is then updated, and the banner
at the top of the screen is then refreshed to display the Subject's new points score. The values
of all the variables at the end of the 120 second task are stored in the Subjects table, and can
be accessed at later stages.
Practical Advice and Guidance
Screen Size
The average time taken to position a slider at exactly 50 depends on the size of the screen on
which the task is displayed. We used relatively large screens, specically 22 inch widescreen
monitors with a 1680 by 1050 pixel resolution. 48 sliders and a 120 second task length was
an appropriate conguration given the hardware employed, but may need adjusting if run on
a dierent set-up. We believe that with our conguration it is impossible for any subject to
position correctly all of the sliders (see Section 4). This ensures that the subject's eort choice
is not constrained by the design of the task, so there is no incentive to work hard for the purpose
of being able to rest at the end of the task.
6The code is the same as used by Gill and Prowse (2012) for the First Movers, except that the number of
rounds has been set to one, the banner informing the subject that she is a First Mover has been removed and the
line informing the subject of the prize for the round has also been removed.
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Mice and Keyboards
To treat all subjects equally, they should use the same specication of mouse. Our subjects used
800 dpi USB mice with the scroll wheel disabled (by removing them from the mice) to prevent
subjects from using the scroll wheel to position the sliders.7 (Using the scroll wheel makes posi-
tioning the sliders much easier and requires less eort than a dragging and dropping technique
using the left mouse button). Similarly, the keyboards were also disabled (by unplugging them)
to prevent the subjects using the arrow keys to position the sliders. As well as dragging and
dropping, it is possible to move the sliders in large xed discrete steps by clicking the left mouse
button with the cursor to the right or left of the current slider position. We did not point this
out explicitly to our subjects, but told them that they could use the mouse in any way they
liked to move the sliders.
Physical Space and Other Environmental Factors
Given subjects are being asked to complete a real eort task it is important that they all have
the same amount of physical space, i.e., all the booths are the same size, and that all subjects
have the same equipment, e.g., mouse mats, chairs etc.
Practice rounds
Practice rounds, with the opportunity for questions at the end of each round, are recommended
to allow subjects to become familiar with the task. We used two practice rounds. Data from
the practice rounds and the paying rounds indicate that this was sucient practice. Specically,
after two practice rounds the round-on-round increase in eort was similar across rounds.
6 Conclusion
In this note we have described a computerized real eort task designed to overcome some of the
drawbacks of existing real eort tasks. In particular, our slider task provides a nely gradated
measure of performance and can be repeated many times in an experimental session. This allows
the experimenter to control for persistent unobserved heterogeneity, allowing robust statistical
inference. We believe that the slider task is a valuable addition to the stock of existing real eort
tasks which will prove useful to researchers designing future real eort experiments. We have
provided z-Tree code and guidance notes designed to assist researchers wishing to implement
the slider task in the laboratory.
7Christopher Zeppenfeld (Cologne Graduate School) has kindly informed us that it is also possible to use an
AutoHotKeys script in conjunction with z-Tree to disable the scroll wheel.
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